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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to assess the appropriateness of two contrasting models of governance to
organisations within the social enterprise sector.
Design/methodology/approach – In order to achieve this aim the paper draws on theories of
for-profit governance, particularly the stewardship model, and theories of non-profit governance,
particularly the democratic model. Theoretical insights from these literatures are then combined with
the emerging literature on social enterprise.
Findings – Two propositions result from this which posit that social enterprise, despite being located
within the non-profit sector, may be more likely to exhibit for-profit forms of governance.
Practical implications – Practitioners within social enterprises, and those operating in advisory
roles to the sector, could benefit from the argument advanced in the paper in that it offers a potential
governance solution to the distinctive management challenges being faced by social enterprises.
Originality/value – The paper contributes a framework for examining governance within social
enterprises, and offers a guide for future research into social enterprise governance.
Keywords Corporate governance, Corporate social responsibility
Paper type Conceptual paper
Introduction
The governance of organisations has received much attention in recent years. A useful
definition for this concept is that governance “is the relationship among various
participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations” (Monks and
Minow, 1995, p. 1). This can be adapted to embrace sectors beyond for-profits by
replacing “corporations” with “organisations” more generally. Participants within the
governance function of corporations typically include shareholders, senior
management and the board of directors. They have rights and obligations that are
enshrined in law. In contrast, participants in the not-for-profit sector do not have the
same legal entitlement to participation in governance. For example, the beneficiaries of
a charity may wish to influence the direction of a charity but have no recourse to law if
their lobbying is overlooked.
This paper is concerned principally with boards as the locus of organisational
governance. It is at board level that critical decisions are made. Other parties may
influence these decisions through mechanisms such as motions put down at annual
general meetings but ultimately the board has a significant degree of autonomy to do
as it pleases. The board “bears the ultimate responsibility for the integrity of the
corporation [and] general compliance with law” (OECD, 1998, p. 49) and so requires its
members to have a commitment to the well-being of the organisation and both the
skills and experience to discharge such a role.
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0306-8293.htm
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The importance of governance has been acknowledged by academics and
policy-makers alike in recent years. Academic research has been wide-ranging
and not confined to any particular sector of the economy, with public, private and
voluntary organisations all being analysed. The issues dominating each have
varied. The public sector has been subject to debates over the decentralising of
decision-making resulting from policies of outsourcing service provision. This has
promoted analyses that have examined the role played by citizens, rather than
solely government officials, in formulating services and monitoring their quality
(Rhodes, 2000). Research into the private sector has tended to focus on issues such
as how to reduce the incidence of fraudulent behaviour by corporate executives.
This is not surprising given the spate of corporate scandals that have emerged.
One principal mechanism that has been examined is the role played by
non-executive directors (Dunn and Riley, 2004). Voluntary sector governance
research meanwhile has sought to investigate a range of aspects including the
function (Abzug and Galaskiewicz, 2001) and composition (Iecovich, 2005) of
boards of management. The emphasis in this body of work, in common with
private sector governance issues, is often on the identification of some notion of
good practice in board operations.
This paper examines governance specifically within social enterprises. This is a
critical part of social enterprise management. Whether referred to as a board of
directors or a management committee, this is the area of management that sets the
overall framework within which the organisation operates. It is a neglected area to
date within social enterprise research where the focus has tended to be on the
political (Dart, 2004; Fowler, 2000) or the micro-operational (Dees et al., 2001).
Co-operative research has paid attention to governance (Infield, 1998) but the wider
forms of social enterprise, for example, company limited by guarantee, have
received little attention. This absence is significant as the governance dynamics
within social enterprises constituted as companies have the potential to be quite
distinct from those within co-operative, mutual benefit organisations. These
company dynamics, and the governance responses that may be necessary to deal
with these dynamics, will be identified in the paper. This provides a platform for
theorising about social enterprise governance in order to begin to address the gap
in existing research.
In order to provide a base on which to build a theory specifically for social
enterprise governance, the limited company form of social enterprise (mainly
limited by guarantee, but can include by shares) can be usefully compared to
voluntary sector organisations that are governed by boards or management
committees, and inevitably to the limited company form found in the corporate
sector (limited by shares). Therefore, the paper begins by examining both
stewardship and democratic models of governance. The next section examines the
rationale for treating social enterprises as a form of organisation that is distinct
from more traditional for-profits and non-profits. This rationale then forms a
foundation for a consideration of governance within social enterprises and how
this might also be distinctive. This section offers two propositions focussing on
social enterprise governance. The paper concludes by detailing the research that is
necessary to investigate these propositions and that can meet the need for sector
specific studies which are necessary for theory-building.
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Governance theory
The theoretical thrust of governance research varies depending on which sector
is under investigation. Within corporate governance theory the dominant paradigm is
that of a stewardship model of governance (Muth and Donaldson, 1998) which
emphasises “the capacity and willingness of managers to balance different interests in
the professional pursuit of company strategy” (Clarke, 2005, p. 604). In most if not all
cases the company strategy is financial maximisation either through sales, share value,
dividends or other financial measures. Whichever measure is used the aim is the same
– to maximise the wealth of shareholders. The concept of stewardship emphasises the
role of the board in their capacity as agents of shareholders and whose primary task is
to utilise share capital in ways that will result in increased value. The board are
believed to have a duty to act in the interests of the owners of the corporation and so
are responsible for facilitating organisational performance through effective
decision-making which is achieved by electing board members on the basis of their
expertise (Iecovich, 2005).
The idea that boards do act in a stewardship capacity has been challenged by
successive corporate scandals. In the aftermath of the Enron scandal in the US, Clarke
(2005, p. 604) noted that:
. . . it was in their fundamental failure to uphold their stewardship and fiduciary duties that
the Enron executives were most irresponsible.
This and other scandals have promoted a number of governance reviews which have
sought to attempt to combat the problem of corporate fraud. These reviews have
focussed on both the operation and composition of boards. For example, Higgs (2003)
advocated a greater role for non-executive directors in governance as one mechanism
to reduce the threat of what he referred to as “lapses”. In addition he argued that these
directors be drawn from a wider pool in order to reduce the cosiness that is seen as
encouraging less rigorous governance activities. Whether the board always acts in
reality in accordance with the theoretical stewardship model is therefore questionable.
However, as a guiding ideal it remains in place, in law if not always in practice.
Within the theoretical analysis of non-profit boards a counter view of governance
dominates, with the board being modelled as a tool of democratic participation. These
contrasting views are related to the tension between shareholder and stakeholder
perspectives of the corporation. The corporate governance literature proceeds from the
assumption that mechanisms should be in place to ensure that corporate managers
meet the interests of shareholders (Child and Rodrigues, 2004). Hence there is a
preoccupation in the literature with topics such as the role and effectiveness of
non-executive directors in the monitoring of executives (Long et al., 2005). The
stakeholder corporation literature however is founded on the assumption that giving
such prominence to shareholders is problematic and that corporate governance should
in fact be the arena for attending to the legitimate interests of all stakeholders through
mechanisms such as giving board positions to stakeholder representatives (Donaldson
and Preston, 1995; Goodpaster, 1993). Much of this debate can be traced directly to
beliefs about the claims that exist on the assets of the organisation. Shareholder claims
on the corporation are questioned by stakeholder theorists who take issue with the
principle of private property freedoms, despite their protestations to the contrary
(Goodpaster, 1993).
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Social enterprises are widely viewed as stakeholder organisations not least because
of the assumption about their asset base. Non-profits are theoretically owned by the
community rather than by shareholders (Pearce, 2003). They may have assets but these
are held in trust and so are locked-in for community benefit (Dunn and Riley, 2004).
There is no direct claim to be made on these assets other than by creditors in the case of
insolvency. Therefore, the democratic model has at its heart the idea that:
. . . the major role of governing boards is to represent the interests of various constituencies
and groups (Iecovich, 2005, p. 162).
The guiding principle of such a perspective is organisational legitimacy (Suchman,
1995). This view of organisations relies on a perspective that assumes that the external
environment is a powerful force acting upon the organisation, and that those outside
of the organisation confer a form of approval on the actions of the organisation. This
contrasts with the stewardship model as it opens up the prospect that organisations
can be judged not only from above (by shareholders) but also from below by
stakeholders at large (Abzug and Galaskiewicz, 2001).
Implicit to the democratic model is the notion that individual expertise in
governance is secondary to a claim to be a representative of a particular stakeholder
group. Although this suggests that governance expertise is mutually exclusive to
representative status – a telling observation about theorists’ beliefs about stakeholder
capabilities – more importantly it highlights the tension between theories of corporate
and non-profit governance. Corporate governance believes in board members
qualifying purely on the basis of expertise in managing and accumulating assets. In
contrast, non-profit governance is built on the notion that those managing an
organisation at the highest level should be on the board because of who they represent
rather than their ability to manage the assets of the organisation. It follows therefore
that the performance of a non-profit will be judged in part on the basis of who is on
their board rather than what they achieve whilst in that role (Abzug and Galaskiewicz,
2001). These broad perspectives are summarised in Table I.
Social enterprise governance
The preceding discussion frames the polarity between the role and purpose of boards
within the for-profit and non-profit sectors. Attention is given in this section to a
consideration of what relevance these models might have for social enterprise
governance. The notion that social enterprises form a distinct sector in their own right
has become an acknowledged fact. They tend to be categorised as a sub-set of the
non-profit sector (Pearce, 2003; Dunn and Riley, 2004). This would suggest that social
enterprises will exhibit a democratic model of governance. However, as Dart (2004,
p. 415) notes, social enterprises “enact hybrid non-profit and for-profit activities”. This
suggests that, in theory at least, social enterprise governance may in turn be a hybrid
of for-profit stewardship and non-profit democratic models. This section examines to
Category of
organisation Ownership
Governance
model
Dominant
perspective
For-profit Shareholders have claim on assets Stewardship Shareholder
Non-profit Assets locked in Democratic Stakeholder
Table I.
Governance models in
different sectors
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what extent these competing views of governance might apply to social enterprises
and therefore what this might tell us about social enterprise governance practice.
Social enterprise and the non-profit sector
In order to frame this examination of social enterprise governance it is first necessary
to examine the claim that social enterprises are a distinct group of organisations, and to
isolate just what it is that makes them different. Dart (2004, pp. 414-5) characterises
nonprofits as “voluntaristic, prosocial, and civic”, which offers little as a set of
distinguishing factors as social enterprises also tend to exhibit these characteristics. Of
more use is Dart’s contention that non-profit organisations are “distinct from business
organisations”. This is in sharp contrast to social enterprises which tend to go to great
lengths to present themselves as not being distinct from businesses. They wish to be
seen as possessing rigorous performance objectives, not least in financial management
terms. Social enterprises therefore “blur boundaries between nonprofit and for profit”
in part through the use of “corporate planning and business design tools” (Dart, 2004,
p. 415).
An argument against the identification of social enterprises as a sector separate
from other non-profits is that many charities, notably the bigger ones, have formalised
trading activities in addition to their service provision and advocacy work. These
trading activities often take the form of retail outlets that sell a range of items, many of
which are donated by the same people that shop there. However, the fact that these
organisations explicitly hive off trading into subsidiaries that invariably covenant
profits back to the centre, actually reinforces the case for identifying a separate sector.
The social enterprises that come to mind in this case are those that are explicitly
community located and that primarily sell their actual services rather than sell
something separate (often donated goods) to their services. These social enterprises
may share legal forms with the trading arms of charities, typically companies limited
by guarantee, but that is where the similarity ends. Two illustrative examples are
offered of this form of social enterprise. Whilst these cases are real and based on the
author’s consultancy experiences, in formal research terms they are essentially
anecdotal. Therefore, no claim is made for their rigour or representative status. Rather,
these examples merely highlight the tensions that can exist within social enterprises
and, it is contended, that only the governance function can adequately address.
Case one
As the first illustrative example of this form of social enterprise, consider a
community-based company that runs a facility that hosts community group activities.
This facility is of high enough quality, and in the right location, to house offices
suitable for a professional services provider such as a commercial legal practice. In
addition it has the capacity to host trade conferences. Therefore, the social enterprise
has the opportunity to engage in high margin activities such as lettings and
conferences which offer minimal social benefit but which maximise income and hence
impact positively on financial stability. Offering such services can impinge on the
ability to provide space for the core socially valued activity which the company was
set-up to deliver in the first place. For example, in place of an office the company could
allow a community group to use a room at minimal cost for some socially positive
group activity such as an aerobics class.
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Case two
A second example of this form of social enterprise is that of a childcare provider. This
enterprise may have built a decent reputation in a given area and as a result been
offered a deal to block sell the majority of its places to a local private sector employer.
This would offer a regular and consistent source of income. If the childcare company
decided to turn down this contract, they would then leave themselves open to the
possibility of lower income from serving low-paid parents who require irregular times
and variable periods for their children to be cared for (for example, shift workers on
short term contracts). The resultant variability in take-up would be likely to reduce the
occupancy below that to be expected from a block booking. However, by refusing
the contract they would retain the ability to offer the greatest choice to those with the
greatest need.
Both of these cases emphasise the heightened sense of conflict that can emerge
between social and financial objectives in social enterprises of this nature. This is in
contrast to the subsidiary model of enterprise where such conflicts are less likely to
occur. If a single organisation is trying to provide social provision while trading using
this same provision then a management style that can embrace both is required.
Fowler (2000, p. 652) identifies the difficulty of:
. . . managing the interplay between potentially competing sets of values – social action set
against the demands of market behaviour.
For the enterprise involved, the non-profit mantra of “can’t pay, use our service
anyway” must shift to incorporating a view that if they “can pay, then make them
pay”. This duality requires highly sophisticated judgements about the use to which
company assets are put.
Governance models applied to social enterprise
This management challenge is played out at all levels but ultimately responsibility for
addressing it rests at board level. As Fowler (2000, p. 645) concludes, social enterprise
“calls for a specific type of capability to manage a non-profit-for-profit organisation all
‘under one roof’”. This view was reinforced by an analysis of the sector that noted that
enterprises:
. . . often have boards of directors or trustees who come from a voluntary sector rather than a
business background. This can lead to a lack of business focus and prevent social enterprises
from truly reaching their potential (DTI, 2002, p. 62).
The situation faced by social enterprises suggests that they must be capable of using
the assets they have to maximum effect. This requires that they make decisions that
reflect the needs of their community interest whilst ensuring financial sustainability.
The democratic form of governance would appear therefore to be of limited use in these
circumstances. This gives rise to the proposition:
P1. Social enterprises boards are more likely to exhibit a stewardship model of
governance than the democratic model found in other non-profits.
The assumption behind this proposition is that organisations that are attempting to
operate using a transactional model will require a different form of governance to those
organisations that are grant-dependent. These grant driven organisations tend to have
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a board that is democratic with representation from service-users, funding bodies, local
authorities and the like. The complexities of trading are likely to drive a requirement
for a more stewardship driven form of governance that relies less on representing
diverse interests and more on a board that is capable of managing assets for greater
return. Unlike private sector stewardship though, the surplus generated is not designed
to increase shareholder wealth but is to be used to maximise social benefit. The focus
on asset management contrasts with the democratic governance model that attempts to
achieve greater social impact through a focus by the board on fundraising through
their contacts or application writing skills (Mathiasen, 1998). As the emphasis of the
board’s activity is different in social enterprise, it therefore follows that it is likely that
the composition of the board will be different. This gives rise to a second proposition:
P2. In order to enact the stewardship model social enterprise boards are more
likely to recruit members on the basis of expertise rather than representative
status
The expertise being referred to in this proposition is essentially business experience.
Board members who have experience of managing organisations that reward profit
margin rather than social impact will tend to be useful in strategic decision-making
about how best to use the assets of the organisation. There may well be some
resistance to this notion of candidates for boards being judged on their commercial
abilities, with some stakeholders likely to cast it as anti-democratic (Low and Cowton,
2004). However, the counter-argument to this is that too much influence by
representatives whose preoccupation is social rather than financial could result in the
company turning away contracts that could offer financial sustainability.
An additional factor that supports this contention that boards are likely to become
more stewardship orientated concerns the current orthodoxy around social enterprise
and financing. A recent report advocated that social enterprises should aim for growth
through standard forms of financing including equity (Bank of England, 2003). The UK
government has created a legal form explicitly for this purpose, the Community
Interest Company (CIC). The CIC form requires an organisation to have an explicit
social mission and also places a cap on shareholder dividends, thereby protecting the
company from an emptying out of assets (Dunn and Riley, 2004). This move towards
external sources of finance is likely to increase the tendency of enterprises to adopt a
stewardship approach to the governance function as the organisation will be handling
shareholder funds and attempting to manage them to maximum effect.
Concluding remarks
There is a need for research of the social enterprise sector in general but this paper
suggests that the governance function requires more attention than others due to its
significance. Social enterprise governance is an area that attracts much attention from
those seeking to decide whether an organisation should be eligible to be considered for
government contracts or alternately apply for grants (Walmsley, 2003). Evidence is
demanded by external parties that demonstrate that social enterprises have democratic
legitimacy through the involvement of stakeholders at the highest levels of the
organisation (Pearce, 2003). Therefore, any suggestion of a shift towards a stewardship
model, which can be cast as anti-democratic as it will inevitably exclude some
stakeholders on the basis of expertise, requires mapping. In theory, if not necessarily in
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reality, a move towards a stewardship model is likely to be seen as a shift from
a stakeholder to a shareholder focus. This is despite the introduction of limits on
shareholder control such as those outlined in the CIC legislation, which explicitly
demands that community interests should be the main driver of decision-making
rather than financial returns for shareholders (CIC Regulator, 2005). A further rationale
for research into social enterprise governance is that if organisations are shifting from
one governance model to another then the impact that this can have on other elements
of the organisation and its performance should be examined. If the assumption that
is often stated in the governance literature, that governance is critical to an
organisation’s performance (Child and Rodrigues, 2004; Rhodes, 2000), is to be tested
then this is an ideal opportunity to do just that.
The origins of the corporate governance literature, with its focus on the separation
of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932), have resulted in a preoccupation
with shareholders. The crisis of confidence in publicly limited companies, which has
been observed in recent years due to executive fraud, has had to be addressed to reduce
the likelihood of a reduction in the shareholder base as investors seek other
mechanisms for financial return. Social enterprise is unlikely to be immune to the need
to project an image of probity in its ability to manage assets, nor is it likely to be
immune to senior managers wishing to commit fraudulent acts. Therefore, the findings
and theories that constitute the corporate governance literature are likely to become
more applicable over time to the practice and theory of social enterprise governance.
If social enterprises are to attract investment then it seems inevitable that the
stewardship model of governance will emerge in part to operate as a signal to investors
about the effectiveness of asset management within these organisations. Studies of
corporate governance, and in particular the focus on the stewardship model, are
relevant to social enterprise in that they emphasise the need for organisations to have
mechanisms in place to bring directors to account. The new social enterprise legal form
being encouraged at present, the CIC, explicitly limits accountability within social
enterprises by limiting shareholder voting powers while at the same time offering only
a modest increase in other stakeholder powers (Dunn and Riley, 2004). This has the
potential to open up social enterprises to the threat of the misappropriation of
shareholder assets seen all too often in recent years. Regardless of whether the assets
of social enterprises are in fact owned by shareholders or the community, the point
remains that these assets must be devoted to community benefit, while at the same
time being protected from misappropriation by senior managers.
The argument advanced in this paper is undoubtedly a contentious one given that it
proposes that social enterprises, despite being a sub-set of the non-profit sector, are
unlikely to exhibit the model of governance typically found in that sector. Such claims
require rigorous research within empirical contexts in order to give them more than
just theoretical value. The present climate offers particular opportunities to test the
claims made. Many new organisations are appearing who refer to themselves explicitly
as social enterprises. An examination of their boards in terms of how they operate and
who they elect can shed light on the dominant form of governance in evidence.
In addition there are many non-profits who are attempting to make the transition to
social enterprise. This offers another angle on the governance issue as it creates the
ideal situation in which to track changes in board operation and membership over time
and so examine live the process of change through which organisations go. If boards
The governance
of social
enterprise
383
are seen to change significantly over this period of transition it would support the
proposition that social enterprises, whether wholly new organisations or those
emerging from other organisational forms, exhibit a distinctive stewardship model of
governance.
Two additional questions arise for investigation. First, the identification of a
dominant governance model in the social enterprise sector does not necessarily mean
that this model is the most effective. To assess board effectiveness is never easy but it
is made more difficult in this case because hard decisions have to be made about the
measures that could be used. In corporate governance research a focus on financial
measures can be utilised. For social enterprise, researchers must create criteria that
reflect the split between financial and social objectives. As part of the proposed
research attempts could be made to pilot different sets of criteria to address the
effectiveness issue. The second question that arises is concerned with whether
the non-profit organisations themselves perceive that there is a distinctive challenge
awaiting them in the social enterprise form and whether they intend to actively change
the composition of the board to reflect the change to social enterprise. It may be that
non-profits merely continue with the democratic model that has served them well in
the past. They may only change when situations present themselves that reveal the
inadequacy of the board in dealing with the complexities that social enterprises must
navigate in balancing social and trading objectives.
References
Abzug, R. and Galaskiewicz, J. (2001), “Nonprofit boards: crucibles of expertise or symbols of
local identities?”, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 51-73.
Bank of England (2003), The Financing of Social Enterprises, HMSO, London.
Berle, A.A. and Means, G.C. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan,
New York, NY.
Child, J. and Rodrigues, S.B. (2004), “Repairing the breach of trust in corporate governance”,
Corporate Governance, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 143-52.
Clarke, T. (2005), “Accounting for Enron: shareholder value and stakeholder interests”,
Corporate Governance, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 598-612.
Community Interest Company regulator (2005), “Chapter 10.1 role of directors and members”,
available at: www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidance/Part10package.pdf (accessed
29 September 2005).
Dart, R. (2004), “The legitimacy of social enterprise”, Nonprofit Management & Leadership,
Vol. 14 No. 4, pp. 411-24.
Dees, G.J., Emerson, J. and Economy, P. (2001), Enterprising Nonprofits: A Toolkit for Social
Entrepreneurs, Wiley, London.
Donaldson, L. and Preston, M. (1995), “The stakeholder theory of the corporation: concepts,
evidence, and implications”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 85-91.
DTI (2002), Social Enterprise: A Strategy for Success, HMSO, London.
Dunn, A. and Riley, C.A. (2004), “Supporting the not-for-profit sector: the government’s review of
charitable and social enterprise”, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 67 No. 4, pp. 632-57.
Fowler, A. (2000), “NGDOs as a moment in history: beyond aid to social entrepreneurship or civic
innovation?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 637-54.
IJSE
33,5/6
384
Goodpaster, K. (1993), “Business ethics and stakeholder analysis”, in Winkler, E. and Coombs, J.
(Eds), Applied Ethics: A Reader, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 229-48.
Higgs, D. (2003), Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors, DTI HMSO,
London.
Iecovich, E. (2005), “The profile of board membership in Israeli voluntary organisations”,
Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 16 No. 2,
pp. 161-80.
Infield, H.F. (1998), Co-operative Communities at Work, Routledge, London.
Long, T., Dulewicz, V. and Gay, K. (2005), “The role of the non-executive director: findings of an
empirical investigation into the differences between listed and unlisted UK boards”,
Corporate Governance, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 667-79.
Low, C. and Cowton, C. (2004), “Beyond stakeholder engagement: the challenges of stakeholder
participation in corporate governance”, International Journal of Business Governance and
Ethics, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 45-55.
Mathiasen, K. (1998), “Board passages: three key stages in a nonprofit board’s life cycle”,
National Center for Nonprofit Boards, available at: www.managementassistance.org/
page4b.html (accessed 26 July 2005).
Monks, R.A.G. and Minow, N. (1995), Corporate Governance, Blackwell, Oxford.
Muth, M.M. and Donaldson, L. (1998), “Stewardship theory and board structure: a contingency
approach”, Corporate Governance, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 5-28.
OECD (1998), “Corporate governance”, OECD, Paris.
Pearce, J. (2003), Social Enterprise in Anytown, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, London.
Rhodes, R.A.W. (2000), “Governance and public administration”, in Pierre, J. (Ed.), Debating
Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 54-90.
Suchman, M. (1995), “Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches”, Academy of
Management Review, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 571-610.
Walmsley, K. (2003), “Community interest companies”, Chartered Secretary, August, p. 3.
Corresponding author
Chris Low can be contacted at: c.j.low@hud.ac.uk
The governance
of social
enterprise
385
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: reprints@emeraldinsight.com
Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
